Incentive Mechanism for Inhibiting Developer’s Moral Hazard Behavior in China’s Sponge City Projects

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Advances in Civil Engineering

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Figure 3: Incentive Mechanism for Inhibiting Developer’s Moral Hazard Behavior in China’s Sponge City Projects 