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| Performance indicators | Project performance | Score | Total score |
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| Economic aspect | | | 2.05 |
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| Economic evaluation (EC1) | (i) At a discount rate of 8.5% for the Rogun project, the dynamic unit cost of the first phase project is 3.9 cents/kWh, which will be reduced to 2.5 cents/kWh if the two phases are developed together. The economic internal rate of return (IRR) is 11% for the first phase and 16% for both phases [60].
(ii) The projected budget of $2.5 billion by May 2019 is exhausted. A total of 6 hydropower units need to be started, and one of them is successfully started [60, 61]. | 3.0 | |
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| Financial viability (EC2) | (i) The project has not been able to pay its promised payments on time. The Rogun HPP arrears over 5 months [62].
(ii) In 2018 and 2019, 18.3% and 17% of government public expenditure were used to support the construction of the Rogun HPP, respectively. In the third quarter of 2018, the financial allocation of the Rogun HPP pushed the fiscal deficit to 4.9% of GDP (World Bank Group, 2018).
(iii) In 2010, authorities raised $185 million through an extensive publicity campaign to sell shares to the public, companies, and institutions. Forced share sales occur when more than 60% of the population lives below the official poverty line.
(iv) In 2010, the Rogun HPP was declared “the exclusive property of the state.” The last request for financial assistance from the Tajikistan authorities to the World Bank for the construction of HPP was rejected.
(v) Masud Sobirov, a Tajikistan economist, also agrees that the governmentdoes not have the financial resources to complete the construction. “The first and second batch of projects may start, but without attracting foreign investment and investors, the continued construction of projects will continue for many years, which will be a heavy burden for the national budget,” Sobirov said [61]. | 1.1 | |
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| Environmental aspect | | | 3.31 |
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| Environmental management plan (EN1) | (i) A public environmental management plan has been established. | 3.3 | |
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| Environmental impact assessment (EN2) | (i) The Rogun HPP carried out a detailed EIA by the International Olympic Committee (IOC).
(ii) There are several site selection options.
(iii) The EIA results were released to the public. | 4 | |
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| Biodiversity (EN3) | (i) The first phase of the reservoir could flood 600 hm2 farmland, a third of which is Arable land and the rest is pasture land [60].
(ii) Biodiversity is low and no important habitats or rare species are endangered. | 2 | |
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| Pollution control measures (EN4) | (i) Management and monitoring plans have been developed. | 2.8 | |
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| Soil erosion and sedimentation (EN5) | (i) Aiming at the problems of soil erosion and sediment deposition, the project adopted a series of protective measures in the diversion stage, including partial salt replacement. In addition, grouting curtain and water injection well are arranged to maintain the balance of return water volume, hydrogeology, and water chemistry ratio. After the completion of the project, the agency will also implement a wide range of grouting curtain [60]. | 4.2 | |
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| Environmental flows assessment (EN6) | (i) The total catchment area of the Vakhsh basin is about 39,000 km2. About 30% of the catchment area is above 4,000 m above sea level and covered with snow and glaciers. Due to its mountainous landform, the river has a high sediment content. The annual runoff of the river at the dam site is about 20 km3, which is equivalent to the long-term average flow of 635 m3/s. Runoff is expected to remain largely intact and unaffected by global climate change until at least 2050 [60]. | 3.6 | |
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| Social aspect | | | 1.76 |
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| Resettlement (SO1) | (i) Local residents have a certain understanding of the project, but the resettlement situation is not optimistic. In late May 2009, Tajikistan authorities relocated the first 232 families from three villages expected to flood the Rogun dam. More than 1,000 people from the Nurobod district of the rocky Rasht valley were moved to Tangara, a cotton-growing region in southern Tajikistan. Resettled people have neither the opportunity to stay in their homelands nor the choice of where to move.
(ii) The Nurobod residents in flooded areas were forced to leave their homes. The inhabitants of these mountain villages will reside in the Danghara, Tursunzoda, and Faizobod valleys. The resettlement process is scheduled to be completed by 2040. In the meantime, 42,000 people from 40 villages will be moved elsewhere. The state has provided 200 million TJS (about $19.4 million) for the resettlement of the villagers.
(iii) The principle of “compensation before relocation” was not observed. The living standards of those affected have declined significantly [63]. | 1 | |
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| Social impact assessment (SO2) | (i) Before the construction of the first and second phases of the project, social impact assessment has been conducted and released to the public.
(ii) The social impact assessment of the project conforms to factual information and seeks advice from local stakeholders and regulatory authorities. However, there are some differences between the social influence performance and the research. | 2.5 | |
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| Communication and negotiation (SO3) | (i) The project did not hold a meeting involving the local public, and the opinions of the local residents could not be well reflected by the stakeholders and the local government.
(ii) A certain level of communication and consultation has been established with the local community. In the first and second phases of the project, the contractor established a dispute appeal mechanism, but it did not play a good role [39]. | 1.8 | |
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| Benefit sharing (SO4) | (i) The Rogun HPP mainly meets the domestic power demand and exports surplus power. Apart from meeting electricity demand and reducing electricity price, no benefit sharing is involved. | 2 | |
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| Risk management | | | 1.9 |
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| Corruption (RI1) | (i) Low-quality cement, steel, and other building materials are used in the Rogun HPP, according to the data from the Asia analysis platform.
(ii) No financial report has been published [62].
(iii) At a meeting of Rogun HPP’s fund control committee in 2019, the panel of experts noted that the state’s budget for construction and loan payments were particularly opaque.
(iv) Following a 2016 audit, the Agency for State Financial Control and anticorruption revealed 186 million Somalini ($19.7 million) in funding shortfalls, registration irregularities, and other financial misconduct [61]. | 1.1 | |
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| Transboundary river management (RI2) | (i) The cross-border impact and risks of the project have been considered [39].
(ii) Tajikistan signed specific agreements and established cooperation institutions [60].
(iii) Monitoring, early warning, and alarm systems have been established.
(iv) Upstream and downstream countries cannot exchange information. | 3.1 | |
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| Information sharing (RI3) | (i) From early March to April 10, 2019, Tajikistan experienced severe power rationing throughout the country. The authorities did not report any information about the shutdown of the first reactor. There are rumors of leaks from the Rogun dam all over the country. The President fired the project’s chief engineer on March 4th, further fueling rumors.
(ii) On March 4th 2019, an accident occurred at the Rogun HPP, forcing the managers in charge to pour water from the reservoir. Officials in charge of the field have not confirmed or disputed the information.
(iii) Tajikistan economists and HPP stocks and funds control committee members Masud Sobirov pointed out that “He has not heard a report from the authorities about spending on HPP” [61]. | 1.5 | |
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