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| Subjects | Indicators | Indicator description |
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| Tenderer | Valid bid ratio X11 | The ratio of valid bids to total bids. The range of value is 0–100%. The tenderer, on purpose of boosting cooperative bidder’s success rate, may reduce the valid bid rate in some way to let the activity less competitive. |
| Selection of tendering method X12 | Dismemberment (unreasonable) or normal bidding activities (reasonable). One is to split project to evade due tender procedure, and the other is to set specific conditions to change the public tender to invited tender, awarding “benefits” to collusive bidders. |
| Tenderers convey tendentious information X13 | Yes or no. The tenderers pass project-related information to collusive bidders or persuade other bid evaluation experts privately to make the related enterprise win the bid. |
| Release timeliness of bidding information X14 | Some tenderers may change the tender release time for collusive bidders’ consideration, resulting in information not accessible simultaneously to advance winning rate. |
| Setting reasonability of technical parameter X15 | Some unreasonable arrangements, for instance, changing range value to specific value, may be done towards to bidders by tenderers. |
| Tendency of tender requirements X16 | Tenderers may require previous business contacts such as construction performance or similar project experience as tender premise to preclude other participants. |
| Extra credit bias X17 | Tenderers may set unreasonable qualification conditions such as the size of registered capital, geography, years of operation, and employees in bid preparation as a way to increase the evaluation score of collusive bidders. |
| Rationality of evaluation setting X18 | Normally evaluation in bid documents should be made in regard to actual project situation, past experience, and relevant regulations, practically the tenderers may set inclined standard and unscientific weight to favor collusive bidders. |
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| Bidder | Bid winning rate X21 | The residual difference indicator is examined. When the residual difference between the actual and predicted winning bids falls outside a certain interval, it indicates that the bidder has a tendency to collude with the tenderers partly. |
| Special requirements compliance X22 | The conformity of unreasonable conditions such as the scale of registered capital, geographical area, years of operation, and employees in tender. |
| Reassessment rate X23 | The value range is 0–100%. When the supervisory authority finds that the bidder’s conditions are consistent with the evaluation factors listed in the agreements or that the bidder has unreasonable practices, it will ask the experts to re-evaluate. |
| Authenticity of bidding materials X24 | Yes or no. During the review of the bidders’ materials, the tenderers may know the materials have problems but keep silent, and then tacit collusion of both sides occurs. |
| Similarity of technical bid parameters X25 | The value range is 0–100%. The technical content similarity between tender party and bidder party, expressed as the overlapping content accounting for the total technical content. |
| Fitness to business documents X26 | The value range is 0–100%. The degree of business conformity (such as project performance, and enterprise qualification) specified in tender documents, expressed as similar content accounting for total content of the business bid. |
| Type of bidder risk appetite X27 | Aggressive, positive, balanced, robust, and conservative. Risk appetite has a significant positive effect on the tendency of collusion, and aggressive risk appetite further stimulates the occurrence of collusive practices. |
| Degree of mastery of key project information X28 | The tenderers may deliberately conceal key information about the project and only let collusive bidders know the information to ensure their dominance in the bid evaluation process. |
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| Bid evaluation expert | Deviation of expert score X31 | The deviation range is examined. There are horizontal deviation and vertical deviation. The experts may be suspicious of collusion when two deviations exceed the range (±10% ∼ ±20%). |
| Reward strength of bid evaluation X32 | The strength of rewards for bid evaluation experts largely reflects whether experts adopt collusive practice, and the greater the strength of rewards based on previous good evaluations, the less likelihood experts’ collusion will occur. |
| Rigor of bid evaluation process X33 | In the bid evaluation process, the experts select the team leader randomly; the experts are guided by the tenderer’s comments and actions and do not question the bid evaluation methods or the experts make targeted remarks. |
| Expert type X34 | Randomly selective experts are tested on personality and psychological scales, and then define according to results as 4 types: Capricious, ambitious without knowledge, independent, and opinion leader, with sequence of decrease in collusion. |
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