Collaborative Supply Mechanism of Government-Subsidized Rental Housing from the Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game in Metropolitan Cities of China

Table 1

Evolutionary game model parameters and variable descriptions.

Parameter	Description
	Benefits of market subject’s participation in supply to government subject
	Benefits of social subject’s participation in supply to government subject
	The cost of policy subsidies for market subject by government intervention strategies
	The cost of policy subsidies for social subject by government intervention strategies
	Supervision cost of government intervention strategy for market subjects
	Supervision cost of government intervention strategy for social subjects
	Direct operating income from market participation strategy
	Indirect reputation gains from market participation strategy
	Returns from market nonparticipation strategy to investment in other projects
	Positive benefits of social participation strategy
	Reputation gains of social participation strategy
	Benefits from social nonparticipation strategies to other projects in investment organisations
	Government gains from the additional benefits of leisure and the efficient allocation of government resources when it takes nonintervention strategy
	Governments that adopt nonintervention strategy will be punished by higher authorities
F	Housing subsidy paid by the society to employees of the unit without participation