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Volume 2017, Article ID 3295436, 11 pages
Research Article

An Evolutionary Game Model of Knowledge Workers’ Counterproductive Work Behaviors Based on Preferences

School of Information Technology, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, No. 169, East Shuanggang Road, Changbei, Nanchang, Jiangxi 330013, China

Correspondence should be addressed to Si-hua Chen; moc.liamxof@hscnairod

Received 22 July 2016; Accepted 13 November 2016; Published 12 January 2017

Academic Editor: Jose Egea

Copyright © 2017 Si-hua Chen. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


Knowledge workers’ counterproductive work behaviors (CWB) always cause great loss to enterprises, but it is hard to supervise these behaviors. Based on the analysis of the causes of these behaviors, this paper builds a theoretical model of knowledge workers’ CWB and proposes that knowledge workers’ CWB are influenced by both rational and irrational factors. Regarding contextual factors and individual factors as risk preferences of knowledge workers, this paper establishes an asymmetrical evolutionary game model of enterprise supervision. Then, multiagent modeling simulation is conducted to discuss the effect of both formal and informal constraints on knowledge workers’ CWB and, based on it, the intervention strategies of enterprises are proposed. The simulation results show that the effect of informal constraints is bigger than the effect of formal constraints. The working environment and knowledge workers’ personality traits are the key factors to produce CWB.