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Complexity
Volume 2017, Article ID 7259032, 14 pages
https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/7259032
Research Article

Evolutionary Network Games: Equilibria from Imitation and Best Response Dynamics

1IMT School for Advanced Studies, 55100 Lucca, Italy
2Istituto dei Sistemi Complessi (ISC-CNR), 00185 Rome, Italy
3Universidad Carlos III, Leganés, 28911 Madrid, Spain

Correspondence should be addressed to Giulio Cimini; ti.accultmi@inimic.oiluig

Received 6 April 2017; Accepted 17 July 2017; Published 24 August 2017

Academic Editor: Tommaso Gili

Copyright © 2017 Giulio Cimini. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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