Stochasticity, Selection, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Two-Level Moran Model of the Snowdrift Game

<div>The plot of <span class="nowrap"><svg height="11.5564pt" id="M150" style="vertical-align:-2.26807pt" version="1.1" viewbox="-0.0498162 -9.28833 23.1568 11.5564" width="23.1568pt" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><path d="M499 88L487 113C459 86 422 65 413 65C403 65 403 74 409 98L461 318C487 426 460 448 431 448C408 448 383 441 352 424C305 398 223 344 157 257H155L243 674C249 702 249 712 240 712C227 712 170 680 87 673L82 648H117C155 648 162 644 150 590L23 -4L30 -12C55 -4 81 3 105 8C113 53 131 150 143 187C199 281 323 387 372 387C390 387 393 369 380 311L328 86C313 19 319 -12 347 -12C379 -12 442 24 499 88Z" id="g113-105"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,6.708,0)"><path d="M300 -147C201 -63 143 98 143 270S200 602 300 686L282 710C136 610 70 450 70 271V270C70 89 136 -72 282 -170L300 -147Z" id="g113-41"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,11.206,0)"><path d="M536 404C536 423 520 448 491 448C445 448 398 404 308 283L286 338C255 416 242 448 217 448C182 448 138 402 92 341L111 321C149 368 169 378 178 378C188 378 198 363 214 320L254 212C185 117 138 65 107 65C98 65 85 69 82 75C79 82 73 86 65 86C44 86 23 60 23 39C23 7 44 -12 71 -12C119 -12 168 33 265 177L306 61C321 17 347 -12 373 -12C413 -12 465 33 507 96L491 119C459 84 432 60 413 60C395 60 378 92 358 148L321 250C341 279 369 310 389 332C417 363 439 382 456 382C466 382 475 376 481 368C486 361 492 358 496 358C513 358 536 381 536 404Z" id="g113-121"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,18.474,0)"><path d="M275 270C275 450 212 609 64 710L45 686C145 604 203 442 203 270S147 -63 45 -147L64 -170C213 -68 275 89 275 270Z" id="g113-42"></path></g></svg>.</span> When <span class="nowrap"><svg height="8.55521pt" id="M151" style="vertical-align:-0.2063904pt" version="1.1" viewbox="-0.0498162 -8.34882 36.0314 8.55521" width="36.0314pt" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><path d="M393 379C402 394 400 411 393 422C384 437 365 448 348 448C301 448 237 372 186 285H182L193 335C210 408 205 448 178 448C150 448 80 402 29 344L45 321C80 355 114 373 122 373C128 373 130 365 124 330C106 228 76 98 50 -5L57 -12C82 -5 112 3 132 6L172 203C196 256 234 304 254 329C275 355 293 367 306 367C318 367 330 360 342 348C347 343 355 343 365 350S386 367 393 379Z" id="g113-115"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,9.12,0)"><path d="M535 323V373H52V323H535ZM535 138V188H52V138H535Z" id="g117-34"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,20.383,0)"><path d="M241 635C89 635 35 457 35 312C35 153 89 -12 240 -12C390 -12 443 166 443 312C443 466 390 635 241 635ZM238 602C329 602 354 454 354 312C354 172 330 22 240 22C152 22 124 173 124 313S148 602 238 602Z" id="g113-49"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,26.623,0)"><path d="M113 -12C146 -12 170 11 170 46C170 78 146 103 114 103S58 78 58 46C58 11 82 -12 113 -12Z" id="g113-47"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,29.587,0)"><path d="M244 635C114 635 38 519 38 422C38 317 111 240 217 240C236 240 255 244 277 256L345 292C311 140 203 39 59 15L64 -15C89 -15 150 -5 204 17C339 72 440 202 440 386C440 521 368 635 244 635ZM228 602C326 602 352 479 352 390C352 370 351 347 348 324C327 308 293 296 258 296C174 296 124 369 124 458C124 517 152 602 228 602Z" id="g113-58"></path></g></svg>,</span> which is<i> above </i><span class="nowrap"><svg height="9.14241pt" id="M152" style="vertical-align:-3.1815pt" version="1.1" viewbox="-0.0498162 -5.96091 11.0981 9.14241" width="11.0981pt" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><path d="M393 379C402 394 400 411 393 422C384 437 365 448 348 448C301 448 237 372 186 285H182L193 335C210 408 205 448 178 448C150 448 80 402 29 344L45 321C80 355 114 373 122 373C128 373 130 365 124 330C106 228 76 98 50 -5L57 -12C82 -5 112 3 132 6L172 203C196 256 234 304 254 329C275 355 293 367 306 367C318 367 330 360 342 348C347 343 355 343 365 350S386 367 393 379Z" id="g113-115"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.0091,0,0,-0.0091,4.901,3.132)"><path d="M486 158C486 177 478 202 466 220C413 228 386 236 336 262C386 288 413 297 466 304C478 323 486 347 485 366C470 376 444 381 422 380C389 338 368 319 321 288C323 345 329 372 349 422C339 442 322 461 305 470C289 461 271 442 262 422C281 372 287 345 290 288C243 319 222 338 189 380C167 381 142 376 125 366C125 347 133 322 145 304C198 296 225 288 275 262C225 236 198 227 145 220C133 201 125 177 126 158C141 148 167 143 189 144C222 186 243 205 290 236C288 179 282 152 262 102C272 82 289 63 306 54C322 63 340 82 350 102C330 152 324 179 321 236C368 205 390 186 422 144C444 143 470 148 486 158Z" id="g50-43"></path></g></svg>,</span> the probability that cooperators will fix is negligible, regardless of the starting frequency of cooperators, as group size increases.</div>

Complexity

fig3

Figure 3

Figure 3: Stochasticity, Selection, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Two-Level Moran Model of the Snowdrift Game 