Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance

Table 1

Notation and description.

Notation	Description
	In the two-echelon supply chain, is supplier and retailer. In the three-echelon supply chain, is supplier, distributor, and retailer
	The marginal price (revenue) of
	Potential demand of the market
	The actual demand of the market
	The profits of
In the two-echelon supply chain with supplier and retailer
	The marginal price (revenue) of under sequential Stackelberg model
	The actual demand of the market under sequential Stackelberg model
	The profits of under sequential Stackelberg model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under sequential collusion model
	The actual demand of the market under sequential collusion model
	The profits of under sequential collusion model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under sequential cheat model
	The actual demand of the market under sequential cheat model
	The profits of under sequential cheat model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under simultaneous Cournot model
	The actual demand of the market under simultaneous Cournot model
	The profits of under simultaneous Cournot model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under simultaneous collusion model
	The actual demand of the market under simultaneous collusion model
	The profits of under simultaneous collusion model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under simultaneous cheat model
	The actual demand of the market under simultaneous cheat model
	The profits of under simultaneous cheat model
In the three-echelon supply chain with supplier, distributor, and retailer
	The marginal price (revenue) of under Benchmark_Stackelberg model
	The actual demand of the market under Benchmark_Stackelberg model
	The profits of under Benchmark_Stackelberg model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under S_D_Collusion model
	The actual demand of the market under S_D_Collusion model
	The profits of under S_D_Collusion model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under S_D_Cheat model
	The actual demand of the market under S_D_Cheat model
	The profits of under S_D_Cheat model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under D_R_Collusion model
	The actual demand of the market under D_R_Collusion model
	The profits of under D_R_Collusion model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under D_R_Cheat model
	The actual demand of the market under D_R_Cheat model
	The profits of under D_R_Cheat model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under S_R_Collusion model
	The actual demand of the market under S_R_Collusion model
	The profits of under S_R_Collusion model
	The marginal price (revenue) of under S_R_Cheat model
	The actual demand of the market under S_R_Cheat model
	The profits of under S_R_Cheat model
	The profits of under the simultaneous game
	The critical discount factor under the sequential game
	The critical discount factor under the simultaneous game
	The critical discount factor under the S_D_Collusion game
	The critical discount factor under the D_R_Collusion game
	The critical discount factor under the S_R_Collusion game
	Profit sharing factor between the supplier and retailer
	The probability of cheating of the supplier and retailer
	Probability of collusion

In the two-echelon supply chain, sequential Stackelberg model represents the benchmark model under the sequential game, sequential collusion model represents the collusion model under the sequential game, sequential cheat model represents the cheat model under the sequential game, simultaneous Cournot model represents the benchmark model under the simultaneous game, simultaneous collusion model represents the collusion model under the simultaneous game, and simultaneous cheat model represents the cheat model under the simultaneous game. In the three-echelon supply chain, Benchmark_Stackelberg model represents the benchmark model (i.e., Stackelberg game), S_D_Collusion model represents the collusion model between the supplier and distributor, S_D_Cheat model represents the cheat model between the supplier and distributor, D_R_Collusion model represents the collusion model between the distributor and retailer, D_R_Cheat model represents the cheat model between the distributor and retailer, S_R_Collusion model represents the collusion model between the supplier and retailer, and S_R_Cheat model represents the cheat model between the supplier and retailer.