|
| Research variable | Measurements | Outer loadings | R2 | Cronbach’s α |
|
| Power asymmetry | PA1: we believe that critical resource control will increase power asymmetry | 0.862 | 0.745 | 0.911 |
| PA2: we believe that information control will increase power asymmetry | 0.785 | 0.735 |
| PA3: we believe that unfair risk sharing will increase power asymmetry | 0.825 | 0.722 |
| PA4: we believe that critical information control will increase power asymmetry | 0.854 | 0.825 |
| Power sharing | PS1: we will disclose information on the master plan and schedule arrangements to another party | 0.755 | 0.711 | 0.836 |
| PS2: facing technical difficulties, we will use resource sharing to work together with another party | 0.836 | 0.812 |
| PS3: dynamic risk sharing mechanisms will be used across the life cycle of the megaproject | 0.814 | 0.734 |
| PA4: we will use deterministic contracts as much as possible to objectively increase the transparency of power | 0.791 | 0.713 |
| Trust level | Inter-organizational (owner and general contractor) | TLEO1: owner believes that another party has the ability to achieve expected results | 0.832 | 0.791 | 0.869 |
| TLEO2: owner believes that another party can meet the technological and management requirements of the project | 0.895 | 0.823 |
| TLEO3: owner believes that another party can be trusted and will fulfill their promises | 0.865 | 0.768 |
| TEOL4: owner believes that another party will consider our interests when making a major decision | 0.792 | 0.698 |
| TLEO5: owner believes that general contractor and departments will not make use of our problems to make profits | 0.785 | 0.735 |
| Intra-organizational (general contractor and its departments) | TLIO1: general contractor believes that departments have the ability to achieve expected results | 0.844 | 0.768 | 0.824 |
| TLIO2: general contractor believes that departments can meet the technological and management requirements | 0.879 | 0.752 |
| TLIO3: general contractor believes that departments can be trusted and will fulfill their promises | 0.797 | 0.743 |
| TLIO4: general contractor believes that departments will abide by the contract throughout the whole project | 0.727 | 0.586 |
| TLIO5: departments believe that general contractor will consider our interests when making a major decision | 0.863 | 0.835 |
| Hybrid governance performance | HGP1: urban rail transit project cost control is effective, and work is completed within the budget | 0.784 | 0.724 | 0.843 |
| HGP2: urban rail transit project appears to have significant cost overruns | 0.833 | 0.785 |
| HGP3: compared with other similar projects in the industry, our organization’s project cost control is better | 0.855 | 0.736 |
| HGP4: in the urban rail transit project, the responsibilities, rights, and obligations are divided fairly and reasonably | 0.894 | 0.841 |
| HGP5: in the urban rail transit project, the contract terms are clear and satisfactory | 0.799 | 0.720 |
| HGP6: in the urban rail transit project, contract goals are consistent with organizations’ needs | 0.737 | 0.613 |
| HGP7: in the urban rail transit project, the contract is considered effective in controlling opportunistic behavior | 0.842 | 0.759 |
| HGP8: we regularly check and evaluate the behavior and performance between organizations under the contract | 0.831 | 0.791 |
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