Research Article

Analysis of Digital Security Governance under the Objectives of Digital Ecology: A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Approach

Table 1

Parameter setting of the tripartite game model.

StakeholdersSymbolsDescriptions

PlatformsBaseline returns in the case of negative governance
Baseline costs in negative governance
The technical, management, operational, and maintenance costs invested in active governance
The hidden benefits, such as corporate reputation and business security generated by active governance
Direct or indirect losses to the platforms caused by data security issues
Fines paid by platforms to local governments after data security issues
Probability of data security issues

Local governmentsThe human, financial, and material costs of participating in DSG
Subsidies provided by the central government for local governments to participate in governance in response to national policies
Local fines paid to the central government after a data security issue
The benefit to local credibility of platforms actively maintaining data security

Central governmentThe additional technical and human cost of adopting the “emergency response” strategy over the “non-emergency response”
The loss recovered for platforms in emergency response to data security crisis
The loss recovered for the locality in emergency response to data security crisis
The loss recovered for the community at large in the emergency response to the data security crisis
Negative environmental externality losses caused by “non-emergency response”
The overall benefit of active governance of the platforms to society