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Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 2006 (2006), Article ID 85653, 32 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/DDNS/2006/85653

A dynamical model of terrorism

1Departments of Civil Engineering, Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering, Mathematics, Systems Architecture Engineering, and Information and Operations Management, 430K Olin Hall, University of Southern California, Los Angeles 90089-1453, CA, USA
2Graduate School, College of Engineering, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley 94720, CA, USA
3Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna 40125, Italy

Received 25 April 2006; Accepted 10 May 2006

Copyright © 2006 Firdaus Udwadia et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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