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Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 2014, Article ID 309489, 9 pages
Research Article

Equilibrium Customer Strategies in the Geo/Geo/1 Queue with Single Working Vacation

Department of Mathematics, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China

Received 10 October 2013; Revised 8 January 2014; Accepted 28 January 2014; Published 23 March 2014

Academic Editor: Leonid Shaikhet

Copyright © 2014 Fang Wang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


This paper is concerned with the equilibrium balking strategies of customers in a Geo/Geo/1 queue with single working vacation. Instead of completely stopping service, the server works with a small probability during the working vacation period. As soon as no customers exist in the system, the server takes a single vacation. The customers decide for themselves whether to enter the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure, the information available about the status of the server, and the queue length on hand upon arrival. We obtain the equilibrium balking strategies in two cases: fully observable and fully unobservable cases, which depend on whether the customers know both the queue length and the state of the server or none of them. Finally, we present several numerical experiments that demonstrate the effect of some parameters on the equilibrium behavior.