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Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 2015, Article ID 345795, 12 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/345795
Research Article

Dynamics in Braess Paradox with Nonimpulsive Commuters

1Department of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis,” University of Torino, 10153 Torino, Italy
2Department of Psychology, University of Torino, 10124 Torino, Italy
3DESP, University of Urbino “Carlo Bo,” 61026 Urbino, Italy
4IST, University of Stuttgart, 70550 Stuttgart, Germany

Received 16 May 2014; Accepted 27 July 2014

Academic Editor: Nikos I. Karachalios

Copyright © 2015 Arianna Dal Forno et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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