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Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 2016, Article ID 9031351, 8 pages
Research Article

Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response

1School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
2Cancer Biology Research Center, Tongji Hospital, Tongji Medical College, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei 430030, China

Received 8 March 2016; Revised 27 April 2016; Accepted 28 April 2016

Academic Editor: Massimiliano Ferrara

Copyright © 2016 Wei Pan et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator’s decision and the effects subject to some parameters.