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Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 2019, Article ID 9231582, 8 pages
Research Article

Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition

College of Science, Guilin University of Technology, Guilin 541004, China

Correspondence should be addressed to Qi-Qing Song; moc.621@gniqiqgnos

Received 23 March 2019; Revised 29 May 2019; Accepted 9 June 2019; Published 25 June 2019

Academic Editor: Miguel Ángel López

Copyright © 2019 Wei-li Zhang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market’s average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations.