Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies

Table 1

Parameters in the tripartite evolutionary game for public health emergencies.

Parameters	Description
	Strict governance cost of the local government
	Nonstrict governance cost of the local government
	Strict implementation cost of the enterprises
	Nonstrict implementation cost of the enterprises
	Enterprises’ subsidy from the local government because of strict implementation
	Supervision cost of the public
	Enterprises’ penalty from the local government because of nonstrict implementation
	Losses to the local government because of enterprises’ nonstrict implementation
	Losses to the public because of enterprises’ nonstrict implementation
	Enterprises’ revenue when adopting strict implementation strategy
	Enterprises’ revenue when adopting nonstrict implementation strategy
	Reputation of the local government because of strict governance behaviors
	Reputation of enterprises because of strict implementation behaviors
	The coefficient of the penalty
	Rewards to the public from the local government due to the public’s supervision behavior