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| Symbol | Description |
|
| A | Probability of industry regulators actively optimizing the business environment of transportation |
| B | The probability of social body implementing supervision |
| C | Probability of efficient implementation of industry supervision by industry regulators |
| D | Probability of credit supervision by society |
| A | Total revenue of the industry |
| B | The industry does not form a virtuous circle and suffers the punishment of society (such as public opinion) |
| C | The loss of industry benefits for not forming a virtuous circle in the industry |
| D | The industry’s input to actively optimize the business environment |
| E | Industry actively optimizing business environment is rewarded by society (e.g., positive media publicity) |
| F | Negative impact (punishment, accountability, public opinion) on the industry’s negative optimization of the business environment |
| G | Negative impact on society for not forming a virtuous circle in the industry (social and economic development, implicating related industries) |
| H | The cost of social implementation of supervision |
| I | The benefits of social implementation of supervision (industry development) |
| J | Costs saved by society not implementing supervision |
| K | Cost of implementing efficient industry regulation by industry regulators |
| L | Additional benefits for industry regulators to implement efficient industry regulation (superior affirmation, government credibility) |
| M | Penalty from society for implementing inefficient industry regulation by industry regulators (reduced credibility, public opinion) |
| N | Costs to society for implementing credit regulation (N < H) |
| O | Social implementation of credit regulation benefits |
| p1 | Industry regulators actively optimize the business environment, and the market does not form a virtuous cycle probability |
| p2 | Industry regulators negatively optimize the business environment, and the market does not form a virtuous cycle probability (p2 > p1) |
| p3 | Industry regulators implement efficient regulation, and the market has not formed a virtuous cycle probability |
| p4 | The probability that the industry regulator implements inefficient regulation and the market does not form a virtuous circle (p4 > p3) |
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