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Journal of Applied Mathematics
Volume 2014, Article ID 321958, 11 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/321958
Research Article

Channels Coordination Game Model Based on Result Fairness Preference and Reciprocal Fairness Preference: A Behavior Game Forecasting and Analysis Method

1School of Economic Mathematics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610074, China
2School of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610074, China

Received 7 May 2014; Revised 3 August 2014; Accepted 24 August 2014; Published 13 October 2014

Academic Editor: Li Guo

Copyright © 2014 Chuan Ding et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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