Cooperation and Game between Producers and Managers Based on the Linear Contract

<table>The relationship between the total risk and the correlation coefficient <svg height="12.175" id="M61" style="vertical-align:-2.29482pt" version="1.1" viewbox="0 0 9.2875004 12.175" width="9.2875004" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
<g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,7.675)"><path d="M516 277q0 -126 -140 -231q-36 -27 -75.5 -42.5t-63.5 -15.5q-38 0 -73 43q-10 -44 -18 -106q-18 -134 -32 -151q-12 -16 -40 -25t-46 -10l-5 14q22 38 84 406q16 92 44.5 146.5t88.5 95.5q68 47 136 47q63 0 101.5 -47.5t38.5 -123.5zM432 259q0 61 -27 101t-79 40
t-82 -49t-49 -148l-24 -127q42 -36 88 -36q79 0 126 61.5t47 157.5z" id="x1D70C"></path></g>
</svg>. <i>Notes</i>. Curve 1 indicates the sum of optimal risks when having the cooperation between the manager and the producer; Curve 2 indicates the sum when having no cooperation.</table>

Journal of Applied Mathematics

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Figure 1

Figure 1: Cooperation and Game between Producers and Managers Based on the Linear Contract 