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Journal of Applied Mathematics
Volume 2015, Article ID 910614, 11 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/910614
Research Article

The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication

1Escuela de Economía y Administración, Universidad Industrial de Santander, Calle 9 con 27, Bucaramanga, Colombia
2ICS, Faculty of Behavioural Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen, Netherlands

Received 1 December 2014; Revised 27 March 2015; Accepted 28 March 2015

Academic Editor: Jens Großer

Copyright © 2015 Luis A. Palacio et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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