Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game

Table 3

Heterogeneous subjects (all and last rounds).

	()	()	()	()
	28.50	15.07	22.14	14.25
	0	0	0	0
	0.53	0.54	0.43	0.48
			1.04	0.76
	0.66	0.63	0.41	0.59
			0.50	0.34
(Predicted) avg. contributions
Overall endowments	37.15	25.57	38.51	25.72
	32.06	22.17	31.97	22.07
	36.04	24.63	36.78	24.68
	39.01	26.77	40.83	26.99
	41.48	28.73	44.45	29.13
	−3112.06	−865.75	−3083.35	−865.16
Obs.	960	240	960	240

This table reports estimates and predictions from two specifications of the model with efficiency concerns accounting for cross subject heterogeneity in the value of . The analysis is conducted both by including all experimental rounds and by focusing on the last five repetitions only. Parameters are estimated through (6). Given the linear restriction , we only report estimates of . Confidence intervals are computed using an inversion of the likelihood-ratio statistic, at the 0.01 level, subject to parameter constraints.