Incentives for Ridesharing: A Case Study of Welfare and Traffic Congestion

<table class="table-group" id="tab3"><tr><td><table class="table"><tr><td class="thead-hr" colspan="2"><hr/></td></tr><tr class="thead"><td class="align_left">Mode</td><td class="align_center">Proportion (%)</td></tr><tr><td class="thead-hr" colspan="2"><hr/></td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">Solo driver</td><td class="align_center">34.33</td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">Ridesharing driver</td><td class="align_center">22.88</td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">Ridesharing passenger</td><td class="align_center">26.42</td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">Reserve options</td><td class="align_center">16.36</td></tr><tr class="table-tr"><td colspan="2"><hr class="tbody-hr"/></td></tr></table></td></tr></table>

Journal of Advanced Transportation

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Table 3

Table 3: Incentives for Ridesharing: A Case Study of Welfare and Traffic Congestion 