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| Defense | Basic method | Pros | Cons |
|
| Wu et al. [1] | Local neighbourhood information | Lightweight | Less efficient in sparse networks |
| Hu et al. [2] | Leashes | Authentication protocol using symmetric cryptography | Communication and processing overhead |
| Hu and Evans [3] | Cooperative protocol using directional antennas | Uses one hop neighbour information | Detects partial wormholes and degrades network connectivity |
| Vu et al. [4] | RTT calculation and encrypted message exchange | High detection rate | High False positives and computation overhead |
| Alam and Chan [5] | RTT calculation and topology comparison | Topology comparison reduces false positives | Communication overhead |
| Ban et al. [6] | Bipartite subgraph theory | Robust in different communication models | High false positives |
| Lu et al. [7] | Connectivity-based approach | Less false positives | Short path wormholes remain undetected |
| Maheshwari et al. [8] | Graph connectivity | Efficient in UDG model | Inaccurate in non-UDG models |
| Wang and Lu [9] | Interactive visualization of wormholes (IVoW) | Improves detection efficiency | Requires domain knowledge and expertise to solve visual analysis problems |
| Čapkun et al. [10] | Distance-bounding algorithm | No additional clock synchronisation | Special hardware needed for time measurement |
| Chiu and Lui [11] | Hop count and delay calculation | High detection rate | Memory overhead |
| Tun and Maw [12] | RTT and number of neighbours calculation | No hardware required | Memory overhead |
| Khalil et al. [13] | Local monitoring using guard nodes | Lightweight and suitable for resource constraint networks | Not efficient in sparse networks |
| Khalil et al. [14] | Isolate attackers by secure central authority (CA) | Isolate attackers with increased scalability; low detection latency | Increased message exchange between CA and mobile nodes |
| Choi et al. [15] | Neighbour node monitoring | Timer prevents wormhole attacks without requiring clock synchronization | Does not support DSR optimization |
| Poovendran and Lazos [16] | Location-based and decentralized | Time synchronization not required | Packet transmission overhead |
| Zhao et al. [17] | Statistical analysis of routing detect wormholes | Lightweight | Detection rate declines in presence of multiple wormholes |
| Lu et al. [18] | Real time secure packet marking algorithm | Detects both active and passive attacks | Wormholes remain undetected in less traffic scenario |
| Wang and Bhargava [19] | MDS-visualization of wormholes | Efficient in case of single wormhole; less false positives | Centralized approach |
| Dong et al. [20] | Distributed approach using network connectivity information | Suitable for contiguous and discrete geometric terrain | Increased node density affects detection performance |
| Chen et al. [21] | DV-hop localization | Range-free localization | Intolerant to packet loss |
| Chen et al. [22] | Mobile beacon and positioning scheme | Energy efficient and high detection probability | Require GPS enabled beacon node to detect wormholes |
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