Review Article
Privacy Models in Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey
Table 5
Network issues: management and trust.
| | Network | Clusters/regions | Trusted issues | Working assumptions |
| [44] | Sensor-sink communication by flooding Routing bases on an initial beacon Each neighbour decides to accept/reject a packet using policy | | Network is trusted for a period after deployment | Set of authentication-encryption protocols in use | [39] | | x | | | [30] | | x | | | [22] | Tree routing | | | | [28] | No need for any specific topology Communication with server is anonymous | | Sensors and sensor-sensor connectivity | | [25] | | | | | [52] | The destination ID for each packet (i.e., the sink) is encrypted | | | | [29] | | | | Events follow a probability distribution; initiate on a random location of the WSN perimeter; eventually terminate within the network | [31] | Ring | x | | Time is slotted, one event per slot | [21] | | x | | | [34] | | | | | [20] | | | | Key management exists | [49] | | | | Random key distribution scheme (e.g., Gligor) | [53] | | | | Mobile environment | [16] | | | | | [46] | Ring | | | | [50] | | x | | | [35] | | | | Time is slotted, one event per slot | [54] | Sensors randomly scattered | x | | | [13] | WSN-suitable routing | | | | [14] | | | | | [24] | | x | | | [38] | | | | | [18] | | | | | [47] | Arbitrary topology | | | | [48] | | | All components are trusted | Set of authentication-encryption protocols in use | [26] | | | | | [42] | | x | | | [27] | | | | | [45] | | x | | | [15] | | | | | [19] | | | | | [32] | | | | | [23] | Homogeneous distribution of nodes | | Sink is trusted | Encrypted messages are sent periodically | [17] | | | | | [43] | | | | Random key distribution scheme (e.g., Gligor) | [36] | | | Sink is trusted | To query a sensor data: need to be registered in the sink and have a smartcard | [33] | | | No TTPs. Law authority has limited trust | | [37] | | | | Key management exists | [40] | | | | | [41] | | | | |
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