A Secure Localization Approach Using Mutual Authentication and Insider Node Validation in Wireless Sensor Networks

Table 2

Prevention of attacks by the proposed model.

Attacks	Attack behaviour	Prevention by our proposed model
Stealing	Signal eavesdropping and tampering	Our proposed model uses encryption to prevent such attacks
Jamming	Sending jamming signal in the working frequency range	Detection is addressed in the proposed algorithm
Collision	Repetition of messages	Not applicable in the proposed model, as the maximum calculation is done by BS and anchor node with minimum message controls
Exhaustion	Sending of unnecessary message	No scope to provide unnecessary message as transmission range is limited to and the distance estimation process is secured
Unfairness	Explicitly taking the control of the channel	Not possible due to the minimum size of the packets
DoS Attacks	Exhaustion of energy of the unknown nodes	Can be monitored directly by the Base Station
Selective forwarding	Selectively forward packets	Using the approach of one-hop neighborhood forwarding is not necessary
Sybil	Possessing multiple identities	Mutual authentication is used
Sinkhole	Maliciously tamper with routing	Mutual authentication is used with the certificates
Wormhole	Shortening the distance to make a fast routing path	The distance estimation is done based upon the light speed which is the maximum speed of transmission can be and therefore no faster route can be created between an anchor and an unknown node
Flooding	Establishing false connections	Broadcasting is limited by the anchor nodes within a limited range of
Tampering	Tampering localization beacons	Both encryption and mutual authentication are used
Insider attack	Compromised anchor nodes may provide false information	Both the distance reduction and distance enlargement attack have been addressed
Range change attack	Changing the range or Angle of Arrival (AoA)	Our proposed model does not incorporate the mechanism of AoA as it works on time interval to calculate the distance and therefore can easily avoid such attack
False beacon location attack	Compromising a beacon and then he can make the beacon broadcast false location	Authentication, limited range, and validation of distance estimation in the proposed approach will help to avoid such attack
False reported location attack	Malicious node reports false	Verification is done at the BS, so there is less chance to report falsified verification