The Inhibition of Institutional Investor Clique on the Tunneling Behavior

Table 3

The impact of institutional investor clique on tunneling behavior.

Variable names	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Fixed effect		Hysteresis effect
	Appropriation of funds	Related party transactions	Appropriation of funds	Related party transactions
Institutional investor clique’s share ratio	−0.0010	−0.0015
	(−7.0863)	(−1.9533)
The institutional investor clique that is lagging for one period			−0.0008	−0.001
			(−5.6417)	(−1.9709)
Company size	−0.0327	−0.0297	−0.0258	−0.0163
	(−6.9354)	(−2.0493)	(−5.9841)	(−1.0560)
Market value	0.0325	0.022	0.0254	0.0014
	−6.9931	−1.4447	−5.9053	−0.0857
The shareholding ratio of the controlling shareholder	−0.0008	−0.0005	−0.0007	−0.0004
	(−9.5862)	(−1.2148)	(−8.6907)	(−0.8240)
Management shareholding	−0.0003	−0.0022	−0.0002	−0.0021
	(−4.7924)	(−7.4665)	(−3.1775)	(−6.5030)
Separation of two rights	−0.0003	0.0009	−0.0003	0.001
	(−2.4973)	−1.1914	(−2.1232)	−1.2349
Company age	0.0007	0.0043	0.0005	0.0036
	−3.081	−3.7444	−2.0656	−2.9654
Board size	−0.0006	−0.0004	0	0.0007
	(−0.7728)	(−0.1104)	(−0.0183)	−0.161
Number of general meetings	0.0034	0.0405	0.0033	0.0419
	−7.1606	−14.2918	−6.5102	−13.4608
Nature of the firm	−0.0031	−0.0029	−0.0015	0.0017
	(−1.7258)	(−0.3230)	(−0.8104)	−0.1681
Equity checks and balances	−0.0065	−0.0343	−0.0071	−0.0362
	(−5.2499)	(−5.4514)	(−5.3599)	(−5.1188)
Constant terms	0.0671	0.3524	0.0689	0.5105
	−2.5648	−2.4859	−2.44	−3.2573
N	21,240	21,240	17,496	17,496

Robust standard errors in parentheses:  < 0.01,  < 0.05,  < 0.1.