Rational Probabilistic Deciders—Part II: Collective Behavior

Kabamba, P. T.; Lin, W.-C.; Meerkov, S. M.

doi:https://doi.org/10.1155/2007/82184

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Research Article | Open Access

Volume 2007 | Article ID 082184 | https://doi.org/10.1155/2007/82184

Rational Probabilistic Deciders—Part II: Collective Behavior

P. T. Kabamba,¹W.-C. Lin,¹and S. M. Meerkov¹

Academic Editor: Jingshan Li

Received07 Dec 2006

Accepted23 Feb 2007

Published30 Apr 2007

Abstract

This paper explores the behavior of rational probabilistic deciders (RPDs) in three types of collectives: zero sum matrix games, fractional interactions, and Edgeworth exchange economies. The properties of steady states and transients are analyzed as a function of the level of rationality, N, and, in some cases, the size of the collective, M. It is shown that collectives of RPDs, may or may not behave rationally, depending, for instance, on the relationship between N and M (under fractional interactions) or N and the minimum amount of product exchange (in Edgeworth economies). The results obtained can be useful for designing rational reconfigurable systems that can autonomously adapt to changing environments.

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Copyright

Copyright © 2007 P. T. Kabamba et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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