Mathematical Problems in Engineering / 2011 / Article / Tab 5

Research Article

Strategic and Tactical Design of Competing Decentralized Supply Chain Networks with Risk-Averse Participants for Markets with Uncertain Demand

Table 5

Optimal values of the supply chain networks in scenario two ( 𝑑 = 0 . 9 ) .

Variables and characteristicsExisting networkNew network

Supply chain network design 𝑁 1 1 = { { 1 , 2 } , { 3 } , { 4 , 5 } } 𝑁 2 2 = { { 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 } , { } }

Utility of network design scenario for the manufacturer 𝑒 𝑀 1 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑀 1 ) 95.403 𝑒 𝑀 2 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑀 2 ) 167.07
Expected profit of the manufacturers in the scenario 𝐸 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑀 1 ) 163.33 𝐸 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑀 2 ) 293.85
Utility and expected profit of retailers in the scenario 𝑒 𝑅 1 1 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 1 1 ) , 𝐸 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 1 1 ) 33.751, 53.751 𝑒 𝑅 1 2 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 1 2 ) , 𝐸 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 1 2 ) 238.030, 419.37
𝑒 𝑅 2 1 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 1 1 ) , 𝐸 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 2 1 ) 26.920, 47.833 𝑒 𝑅 2 2 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 2 2 ) , 𝐸 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 2 2 ) 0, 0
𝑒 𝑅 3 1 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 3 1 ) , 𝐸 (  πœ‹ βˆ— 𝑅 3 1 ) 108.620, 146.88
Wholesale prices and advertising expenditures 𝑀 βˆ— 1 , π‘Ž βˆ— 1 12.778, 11.115 𝑀 βˆ— 2 , π‘Ž βˆ— 2 13.364, 16.3
Profit margins of retailers ( π‘š βˆ— 1 1 , π‘š βˆ— 1 2 , π‘š βˆ— 1 3 ) (3.162, 2.557, 6.916) ( π‘š βˆ— 2 1 , π‘š βˆ— 2 2 ) (5.690, 0)
Service level of retailers ( 𝑠 βˆ— 1 1 , 𝑠 βˆ— 1 2 , 𝑠 βˆ— 1 3 ) (1.581, 0.460, 3.181) ( 𝑠 βˆ— 2 1 , 𝑠 βˆ— 2 2 ) (6.487,0)

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