Optimal Decisions of a Supply Chain with Two Risk-Averse and Competing Retailers under Random Demand

Table 2

Optimal solutions of price-only contract by varying the level of risk aversion and retail competition.

𝜂	𝛾	𝑤	𝑧1=𝑧2	𝑝1=𝑝2	2𝜋𝑅/𝜋𝑀	𝑧1=𝑧2	𝑝1=𝑝2	𝐸𝑓
0.3	0	6.4736	0.0605	9.4232	1.0019	0.2117	8.9471	0.2208
	0.3	6.4737	0.0536	9.3044	0.8763	0.1877	8.8288	0.2365
	0.5	6.4737	0.0498	9.2405	0.8092	0.1746	8.7651	0.2470
	0.7	6.4737	0.0465	9.1857	0.7516	0.1631	8.7105	0.2574
	1	6.4737	0.0423	9.1168	0.6792	0.1486	8.6419	0.2730
0.5	0	6.4736	0.1008	9.4232	1.0023	0.2117	8.9471	0.3679
	0.3	6.4737	0.0893	9.3044	0.8770	0.1877	8.8288	0.3941
	0.5	6.4737	0.0830	9.2405	0.8092	0.1746	8.7651	0.4116
	0.7	6.4737	0.0775	9.1857	0.7516	0.1631	8.7105	0.4289
	1	6.4737	0.0705	9.1168	0.6792	0.1486	8.6419	0.4550
0.7	0	6.4736	0.1411	9.4232	1.0024	0.2117	8.9471	0.5150
	0.3	6.4737	0.1250	9.3044	0.8768	0.1877	8.8288	0.5517
	0.5	6.4737	0.1162	9.2405	0.8092	0.1746	8.7651	0.5762
	0.7	6.4737	0.1085	9.1857	0.7516	0.1631	8.7105	0.6005
	1	6.4737	0.0988	9.1168	0.6785	0.1486	8.6419	0.6373
0.9	0	6.4736	0.1814	9.4232	1.0025	0.2117	8.9471	0.6622
	0.3	6.4737	0.1607	9.3044	0.8768	0.1877	8.8288	0.7093
	0.5	6.4737	0.1494	9.2405	0.8092	0.1746	8.7651	0.7409
	0.7	6.4737	0.1395	9.1857	0.7516	0.1631	8.7105	0.7721
	1	6.4737	0.1270	9.1168	0.6787	0.1486	8.6419	0.8193