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Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Volume 2014, Article ID 930271, 6 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/930271
Research Article

Agent or Borrower? An Incentive of Moral Hazard with China Commercial Guarantee Company

1College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
2China Center for Social Computing and Analytics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China

Received 26 December 2013; Accepted 16 February 2014; Published 23 March 2014

Academic Editor: Fenghua Wen

Copyright © 2014 Feng He et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

How to Cite this Article

Feng He, Wei Zhang, Yongjie Zhang, and Xiong Xiong, “Agent or Borrower? An Incentive of Moral Hazard with China Commercial Guarantee Company,” Mathematical Problems in Engineering, vol. 2014, Article ID 930271, 6 pages, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/930271.