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Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Volume 2015 (2015), Article ID 278094, 7 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/278094
Research Article

Effect Analysis of Service Supply Chain with Dynamic Game under the Condition of Sensitive Demand

1School of Business Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
2Center for Studies of Modern Business, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
3School of Computer Science & Information Engineering, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received 8 December 2014; Revised 10 April 2015; Accepted 12 April 2015

Academic Editor: Chaudry Masood Khalique

Copyright © 2015 Guanglan Zhou and Chunhua Ju. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

Under the real circumstances of service supply chain, there is one demand appearing as the sensitive feature, to face the increasing uncertainty. It could be elaborated upon the decision variables such as price, quantity, and efforts. The member behaviors are operated and coordinated in the process of multiperiod dynamic game. Based on the multiperiod dynamic game theory, the service demand and price, quantity of goods, and efforts of members in the secondary service supply chain are considered. The paper discusses the reputation effect and ratchet effect in the multiperiod dynamic game service supply chain. Additionally, the paper describes this problem, builds a programming model based on the multiperiod dynamic game, and deduces the optimal solution. Furthermore, the paper analyzes the impact of reputation effect and ratchet effect on the agent’s revenue. Through the simulation, it is found that the agency efforts are a combination result of reputation effect and ratchet effect in the process of multiperiod dynamic game. Through the long-term dynamic game, the short-term moral risk in service supply chain can be restrained so that the result under the asymmetric information is the same as that under the complete information.