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Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Volume 2016 (2016), Article ID 1760837, 8 pages
Research Article

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision Behavior for Public-Private Partnership Projects with Public Participation

School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China

Received 15 July 2016; Accepted 21 September 2016

Academic Editor: Anna M. Gil-Lafuente

Copyright © 2016 Congdong Li et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


The public can directly or indirectly participate in the PPP (public-private partnership) projects and then has an impact on the project profit and public or private behavior. To explore the influence of the public participation of the PPP projects supervision behavior, this paper analyzes the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that the supervision strategy is not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit; it can make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level. Therefore, the government should reduce the cost of public participation and improve the public participation level and influence through the application of the Internet, big data, and other advanced technologies, in order to restrain the behavior of the private sector and improve the supervision efficiency.