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Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Volume 2016, Article ID 7508513, 9 pages
Research Article

Dynamic Game Analysis of Coal Electricity Market Involving Multi-Interests

1North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
2Sichuan Electric Power Corporation Power Economic Research Institute, Chengdu 610000, China

Received 7 April 2016; Accepted 8 August 2016

Academic Editor: Yan-Wu Wang

Copyright © 2016 Yu Xiaobao et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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