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Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Volume 2016, Article ID 8098092, 8 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/8098092
Research Article

External Monitoring and Dynamic Behavior in Mutual Funds

1School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China
2Department of Economics, Acadia University, Wolfville, NS, Canada B4P 2R6
3School of Statistics, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China

Received 9 March 2016; Accepted 5 June 2016

Academic Editor: Xiaodong Lin

Copyright © 2016 Jian Wang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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