A Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution between Two Asymmetric Nations

<div>The dynamics of pollution stock under noncooperation or cooperation, where <svg height="9.14241pt" id="M216" style="vertical-align:-3.1815pt" version="1.1" viewbox="-0.0498162 -5.96091 12.2751 9.14241" width="12.2751pt" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><path d="M536 404C536 423 520 448 491 448C445 448 398 404 308 283L286 338C255 416 242 448 217 448C182 448 138 402 92 341L111 321C149 368 169 378 178 378C188 378 198 363 214 320L254 212C185 117 138 65 107 65C98 65 85 69 82 75C79 82 73 86 65 86C44 86 23 60 23 39C23 7 44 -12 71 -12C119 -12 168 33 265 177L306 61C321 17 347 -12 373 -12C413 -12 465 33 507 96L491 119C459 84 432 60 413 60C395 60 378 92 358 148L321 250C341 279 369 310 389 332C417 363 439 382 456 382C466 382 475 376 481 368C486 361 492 358 496 358C513 358 536 381 536 404Z" id="g113-121"></path><glyph.data ascent="3473" descent="-2876" horiz-adv-x="559" vert-adv-y="559"></glyph.data></g><g transform="matrix(.0091,0,0,-0.0091,7.202,3.132)"><path d="M389 0V32C297 38 291 46 291 118V635C234 613 175 595 109 583V556L161 554C203 552 207 547 207 497V118C207 46 201 38 110 32V0H389Z" id="g50-50"></path><glyph.data ascent="3443" descent="-2856" horiz-adv-x="487" vert-adv-y="487"></glyph.data></g></svg> and <svg height="9.14241pt" id="M217" style="vertical-align:-3.1815pt" version="1.1" viewbox="-0.0498162 -5.96091 12.2751 9.14241" width="12.2751pt" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><path d="M536 404C536 423 520 448 491 448C445 448 398 404 308 283L286 338C255 416 242 448 217 448C182 448 138 402 92 341L111 321C149 368 169 378 178 378C188 378 198 363 214 320L254 212C185 117 138 65 107 65C98 65 85 69 82 75C79 82 73 86 65 86C44 86 23 60 23 39C23 7 44 -12 71 -12C119 -12 168 33 265 177L306 61C321 17 347 -12 373 -12C413 -12 465 33 507 96L491 119C459 84 432 60 413 60C395 60 378 92 358 148L321 250C341 279 369 310 389 332C417 363 439 382 456 382C466 382 475 376 481 368C486 361 492 358 496 358C513 358 536 381 536 404Z" id="g113-121"></path><glyph.data ascent="3473" descent="-2876" horiz-adv-x="559" vert-adv-y="559"></glyph.data></g><g transform="matrix(.0091,0,0,-0.0091,7.202,3.132)"><path d="M414 144C384 79 371 75 317 75H135L276 221C367 316 408 376 408 465C408 570 327 635 237 635C179 635 131 609 100 575L42 494L67 471C94 510 138 565 205 565C277 565 321 517 321 435C321 348 258 270 195 195C146 137 88 81 33 26V0H411C423 44 433 88 446 135L414 144Z" id="g50-51"></path><glyph.data ascent="3443" descent="-2856" horiz-adv-x="487" vert-adv-y="487"></glyph.data></g></svg> denote the pollution stock under noncooperation and cooperation, respectively.</div>

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Figure 3

Figure 3: A Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution between Two Asymmetric Nations 