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Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Volume 2018, Article ID 1626429, 11 pages
Research Article

Optimization of the Pricing Strategies between Container Terminals under Deregulation

School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China

Correspondence should be addressed to Gang Dong; nc.ude.utmhs@gnodgnag

Received 26 September 2018; Accepted 14 November 2018; Published 22 November 2018

Academic Editor: Francesc Pozo

Copyright © 2018 Gang Dong. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


According to the dual-track system implemented on port tariffs in past years, the vast majority of state-owned container terminals adopt the standard rates specified by China’s Ministry of Transport, while the container terminals of joint ventures are permitted to charge their stevedoring rate with a 20% float ratio up and down. The latest port reform was to improve the port tariff formation mechanism by speeding up the implementation of detailed list and public notice on port pricing. This paper analyses the optimization of the pricing strategies between container terminals under deregulation. Based on a two-stage noncooperative game theoretical model, the Nash equilibria of pricing strategy profiles between container terminals of one port under deregulation are derived. Although the price-matching strategy may be employed by the foreign-owned container terminal, which usually resulting in a total social welfare loss, the price-matching pricing strategy not being adopted by the state-owned container terminal will avert tacit collusion. Numerical simulation is applied to the case of Shenzhen Port.