Fresh-Keeping Effort and Channel Performance in a Fresh Product Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Consumers’ Returns

Table 1

Summary of the related literature.

Authors	Quality dependent demand	Main decision variable	Types of contract	Contract coordination
Part A: Summary of literature about quality improvement and supply chain coordination
Cai et al. [7]	√	Fresh-keeping effort, order quantity, price	Price-discount sharing contract together with compensation contract	√
Wu et al. [8]	√	Logistics-service level, order quantity, price	Revenue and service-cost sharing contract, price-discount and inventory-risk sharing contract	√
Yu and Xiao [9]	√	Price, logistics-service level	Wholesale price contract
Xu [10]	√	Price, quality	Wholesale price contract
Xie et al. [11]	√	Quality investment, price	Wholesale price contract
Jerath et al. [12]	√	Price, quality, order quantity	Buyback contract, quantity discount contract, revenue sharing contract and two-part contract	√
Leng et al. [13]	√	Price, quality gatekeeping effort	Wholesale price contract
Yang and Chen [14]	√	Carbon emission abatement effort, quantity	Wholesale price contract, cost sharing contract, revenue sharing contract, revenue and cost sharing contract
Authors		Modeling forms of consumer’ return rate		Customer’s risk preference
Part B: Summary of literature about customer return
Che [15]		Uncertain valuation		Risk averse
Davis et al. [16]		Uncertain valuation		Risk neutral
Su [17]		Uncertain valuation		Risk neutral
Xiao et al. [18]		Uncertain valuation		Risk neutral
Chen and Bell [19]		Uncertain valuation		Risk neutral
Hu et al. [20]		Uncertain valuation		Risk neutral
Chen and Bell [21], Chen and Bell [22]		A function of quantity sold and refund price		Risk neutral
Vlachos and Dekker [23], Mostard and Teunter [24], Ruiz-Benitez and Muriel [25], Chen and Zhou [26], Chen and Chen [27], Choi and Guo [28],		A fixed proportion of quantity sold		Risk neutral
Yoo et al. [29]		An increasing linear function of the refund price		Risk neutral
Authors	Loss-averse individual	Single account	Multiple mental accounts	Consumer return
Part C: Summary of literature about loss-averse preference
Schweitzer and Cachon [31]	retailer	√
Wang and Webster [32]	retailer	√
Wang [33]	retailer	√
Wang and Webster [34]	retailer	√
Ho and Zhang [39]	retailer		√
Beckerpeth et al. [40]	newsvendor		√
Davis et al. [41]	retailer		√
Zhang et al. [42]	supplier		√
Samatli-Pac and Shen [43]	customer	√		√
Liao and Li [44]	customer	√		√