Analysis on Altruism-Based Coopetition Game of Oligarchic Enterprises: A Validation of Generation Companies

Table 3

Equilibrium variables under the unilateral altruism threshold of the low-cost generation company.

CEV	AF
	(0.705, 0)	(0.712, 0.1)	(0.717, 0.3)	(0.721, 0.5)	(0.751, 0.6)	(0.846, 0.8)	(1, 1)
		745.10	751.10	764.95	779.49	783.83	789.69	791.67
	420.26	406.74	378.71	349.57	335.42	307.54	280.56
	1165.36	1157.84	1143.66	1129.06	1119.25	1097.23	1072.22
	13587.39	13765.44	14142.54	14537.07	14719.37	15070.99	15399
	4563.89	4519.06	4373.4	4158.7	4045.13	3786.36	3489.61
	18151.27	18284.49	18515.93	18695.77	18764.5	18857.35	18888.61
	1.06	1.07	1.08	1.10	1.11	1.13	1.15