Analysis on Altruism-Based Coopetition Game of Oligarchic Enterprises: A Validation of Generation Companies

Table 4

Equilibrium variables under the unilateral altruism threshold of the high-cost generation company.

CEV	AF
	(0, 0.910)	(0.1, 0.915)	(0.3, 0.922)	(0.5, 0.926)	(0.6, 0.935)	(0.8, 0.963)	(1, 1)
		880.78	872.20	854.41	835.69	826.67	808.88	791.67
	264.05	266.06	270.76	276.24	277.78	279.86	280.56
	1144.84	1138.26	1125.16	1111.93	1104.44	1088.73	1072.22
	15793.53	15765.39	15690.22	15589.92	15550.11	15472.51	15399
	2928.4	2986.65	3114.11	3255.09	3310.44	3409.03	3489.61
	18721.93	18752.04	18804.33	18845.02	18860.56	18881.54	18888.61
	1.08	1.09	1.10	1.11	1.12	1.14	1.15