Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

Table 2

Model parameters.

Parameters	Implications
z1	Total investment of enterprises choosing “active poverty alleviation” behavior strategy
z2	Total investment of enterprises choosing “negative poverty alleviation” behavior strategy
g	Supporting funds to poverty alleviation project provided by the government
s	Means of production provided by the government to poor farmers
r1	Project profits of choosing “active poverty alleviation” behavior strategy and “active participation” behavior strategy for enterprises and poor farmers
r2	Project profits of choosing “active poverty alleviation” behavior strategy and “negative participation” behavior strategy for enterprises and poor farmers
r3	Project profits of choosing “negative poverty alleviation” behavior strategy and “active participation” behavior strategy for enterprises and poor farmers
r4	Project profit of choosing “negative poverty alleviation” behavior strategy and “negative participation” behavior strategy for enterprises and poor farmers
q	Predetermined proportion of the profit, q = z1/(z1 + s)
r5	Working income of poor farmers under “active poverty alleviation” behavior strategy for enterprises
r6	Working income of poor farmers under “negative poverty alleviation” behavior strategy for enterprises
c	Labor cost of poor farmers working at the production base
j1	Rewards to enterprises from the government when they choose “active poverty alleviation” behavior strategy
j2	Rewards to poor farmers from the government when they choose “active participation” behavior strategy
f	Fines to enterprises penalized by the government when they choose “negative poverty alleviation” behavior strategy
p	Probability discovered by the government when enterprises choose “negative poverty alleviation” behavior strategy, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1