role session(Ui, RC, ASj: agent, | SKey1 : symmetric_key, | SKey2 : symmetric_key, | H, MUL,SUB: hash_func) | def= | local SI, SJ, RI, RJ, PI, PJ: channel (dy) | composition | user(Ui, RC, ASj, SKey1, SKey2, H, MUL, SUB, SI, RI) | ∧ rserver(Ui, RC, ASj, SKey1, SKey2, H, MUL, SUB, SJ, RJ) | ∧ aserver(Ui, RC, ASj, SKey1, SKey2, H, MUL, SUB, PI, PJ) | end role | role environment() | def= | const ui, rc, asj: agent, | skey1 : symmetric_key, | skey2 : symmetric_key, | h,mul, sub: hash_func, | idi, pwi, idj, ai, bi, ci, di, ei, fi, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, ri, rj, | rij, ski, skj, n : text, | user_aserver_Ri, aserver_user_Rj, sec1, sec2, sec3, sec4, sec5, | sec6: protocol_id | intruder_knowledge = ui, rc, asj, h, mul, m6, rij, m5, m3, di, | ei, fi, n, m1, m2, idj} | composition | session(rc, ui, asj, skey1, skey2, h, mul, sub) | ∧ session(ui, rc, asj, skey1, skey2, h, mul, sub) | ∧ session(asj, ui, rc, skey1, skey2, h, mul, sub) | end role | goal | secrecy_of sec1 | secrecy_of sec2 | secrecy_of sec3 | secrecy_of sec4 | secrecy_of sec5 | secrecy_of sec6 | authentication_on user_aserver_Ri | authentication_on aserver_user_Rj | end goal | environment() |
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