Review Article

Authentication Protocols for Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Survey

Table 18

Summary of authentication protocols for IoV.

Prot. Network modelGoalsMain processesPerformances (+) and limitations (−)

Cespedes et al. (2013) [39]A vehicular communications network with Access Routers (ARs) that connect the VANET to external IP networksAchieving mutual authentication against authentication attacks(i) Key establishment phase;
(ii) MR registration phase;
(iii) Authentication phase;
(iv) Mobile router revocation
+ Considers the asymmetric links in the VANET.
+ Achieving less location update cost compared with the scheme [206].
+ The handover delay lower than the one in the scheme [206].
+ Resistance to replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and denial of service (DoS) attack.
− Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme [61].
− Lack nonrepudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [64]

Shao et al. (2016) [63]VANET with some parties, including, central authority, tracing manager, many RSUs, and many OBUsGuarantee unforgeability, anonymity, and traceabilityInitialization stage;
Registration stage;
Join stage;
Sign stage;
Verify stage;
Trace stage
+ Efficient in terms of the computational cost of three operations, namely, Initialization, Registration, and Trace.
+ Can prevent replay attacks.
− No comparison with other schemes.
− The communication overhead is not studied.
− Lack nonrepudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [64]

Lyu et al. (2016) [64]VANET with divide messages into two types single-hop beacons and multi-hop traffic data.Guarantee some properties such as timely authentication, nonrepudiation, packet losses resistant, and DoS attacks resistant(i) Chained keys generation;
(ii) Position prediction;
(iii) Merkle hash tree construction;
(iv) Signature generation
+ Considers the nonrepudiation.
+ The computational cost reduces with the increasing of time frame.
+ Can resist packet losses.
+ Maintain high packet processing rate with low storage overhead.
− Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme [61]

Zhang et al. (2016) [65]Trusted authority (TA), a number of RSUs and vehiclesGuarantee the conditional unlinkability, ideal tamper-proof device (TPD) freeness, key escrow freeness(i) Member secrets generation;
(ii) Vehicle sign;
(iii) Message verification and signature storage;
(iv) Trace internal pseudo-identity (IPID) and authentication key update;
(v) On-Line update
+ Efficient in terms of message authentication delay on average.
+ Considers privacy preserving.
+ Resistance to the side-channel attack, false messages attack, denial-of-service (DoS) attack, and Sybil attack.
+ Efficient compared to the ECDSA protocol in [163] and more efficient than the IBA scheme in [52] on average.
− Lack nonrepudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [64]

Zhang et al. (2016) [52]VANET with four main entities, i.e., key generator center (KGC), traffic management authority (TMA), RSUs and vehiclesGuarantee some properties such as message authentication, nonrepudiation, message confidentiality, privacy, and traceability(i) System setup;
(ii) Protocol for STP and STK distribution;
(iii) Protocol for common string synchronization;
(iv) Protocol for vehicular communications
+ Efficient in terms of the average message delay and the verification delay.
+ Efficient in terms of verification delay compared to the scheme in [166].
+ Considers the nonrepudiation.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, message reply, message modification, movement tracking.
− Location privacy is not considered

Dolev et al. (2016) [66]The vehicle network is divided into the controller area network (CAN), local interconnect network (LIN), and media oriented system (MOST)Ensure the countermeasures against the Man-in-the-Middle attack under the vehicle authentication(i) System settings;
(ii) Certificate authority;
(iii) Vehicular attributes
+ Efficient in terms of iteration cost compared to the existing Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols such as ISO-KE [207] and SIGMA [208].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, Man-in-the-Middle attack and impersonation attack.
− Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme [61]

Chan and Zhou (2014) [48]Smart grid electric vehicle ecosystemProvides assurance of the digital identity and the device’s controllability in the physical domain(i) Communication settings;
(ii) Cyber-physical device authentication
+ Resistance to substitution attacks.
− No comparison with other schemes.
− The average message delay and the verification delay are not evaluated