|
| Protocol | Data attacked | Approach |
|
| Lai et al. (2016) [61] | Communication channel between the mobile management entity and the home subscriber server | Mutual authentication and key agreement between multiple M2M devices and the core network simultaneously |
|
| Lai et al. (2013) [38] | The data between the mobiles equipment’s and the 3GPP network | Authentication acknowledge phase |
|
| Cespedes et al. (2013) [39] | (i) Identify a shared key between two legitimate users
(ii) Impersonate a mobile router or a relay router | The keys generated at the mobile router and the relay router for authentication are based on the concept of symmetric polynomials |
|
| Dolev et al. (2016) [66] | Communication channel between the vehicles | (i) Twofold authentication
(ii) Periodic certificate restore |
|
| Nicanfar et al. (2011) [139] | (i) Communication channel between the smart meter and the authentication agent
(ii) Communication channel between the authentication agent and the security associate (SA) server | All packets are fully encrypted with the receivers public key |
|
| Nicanfar et al. (2014) [142] | The passwords of smart meter | Changing the server password more often |
|
| Das (2016) [72] | The login request message during the login phase | Password and biometric update phase |
|
| Lai et al. (2013) [37] | Can occur while connecting to a base station | Authentication acknowledge phase |
|
| Farash et al. (2016) [75] | Data between the sensor node, users, and gateway node | Mutual authentication |
|
| Jiang et al. (2017) [77] | Data between the Sensor node, users and Gateway node | Mutual authentication |
|
| Wu et al. (2016) [146] | Data between the Sensor node, users and Gateway node | Mutual authentication |
|
| Das et al. (2016) [147] | The lost/stolen smart card of a legal user | Password change phase |
|
