|
| Protocol | Data attacked | Approach |
|
| Wasef and Shen (2013) [40] | Forge the revocation check | (i) Linear search algorithm
(ii) Binary search algorithm |
|
| Chung et al. (2016) [69] | Impersonate the mobile node | Login and authentication phase |
|
| Das (2016) [72] | Eavesdrop or intercept the login request message of the previous sessions | Authentication and key agreement phase |
|
| Wu et al. (2016) [146] | The data produced by the smart card in the Login phase | Elliptic curve cryptosystem |
|
| Das et al. (2016) [147] | Eavesdrop, modify, or delete the contents of the transmitted messages | Password and biometric update |
|
| Sun et al. (2015) [53] | Information leakage of the M2M server | The authentication process based on password |
|
| Lai et al. (2014) [47] | Forge and/or modify the authentication messages | (i) Strong anonymous access authentication
(ii) User tracking on a disputed access request |
|
| Dolev et al. (2016) [66] | Forge and/or modify the authentication messages | Two rounds of session key |
|
| Kumari et al. (2016) [68] | Impersonation of user and sensor node | Gateway wireless node does not maintain any record to store user-specific information |
|
| Amin and Biswas (2016) [70] | Intercepts the login request message | Authentication and key agreement |
|
| Gope and Hwang (2016) [71] | The server’s secret key | Adversary has no knowledge about the secret identity of the gateway |
|
| Jiang et al. (2016) [74] | Gets the user smart card | The hash mechanism using the shared key between gateway wireless node and sensor |
|
| Srinivas et al. (2017) [144] | Impersonation of the gateway node | Noninvertible cryptographic one way hash function property |
|
| Kumari et al. (2016) [76] | Impersonation of the gateway node | Secret session key |
|
| Jiang et al. (2017) [77] | Gets the user smart card | Password |
|
| Liu and Chung (2016) [148] | Intercepts the login request message | Password |
|
