Review Article
Secure Multiparty Computation and Trusted Hardware: Examining Adoption Challenges and Opportunities
Table 1
Comparison of the properties provided by classical SMC techniques with those provided by trusted hardware.
| Technique | Required Trust | Code Integrity | Data Integrity | Secure Channel | Enforcement Mechanism | Overhead |
| Garbled Circuits | Minimal | Cut-and-choose | Cut-and-choose | Oblivious Transfer; garbled exchange | ā | High | Homomorphic Encryption | Restricted ops: PHE/SWHE | Not built-in | Operations on encrypted data | Strong cryptography | Secret Sharing | Minimal, with exceptions (threshold) | Limited to well-defined splitting and reconstruction | Verifiable schemes | Secrets not exposed to shareholders | ā | Scheme-dependent; generally high | Intel SGX | CPU, Intel | Local/Remote attestation of enclave contents; enclave only accessible through ECALLs | Shared secret set during attestation | CPU | Low | ARM TrustZone | Secure world OS and trustlets | Code and data in secure world not directly accessible by normal world components | Secure Monitor Call | CPU and bus logic | Specialized Hardware | Hardware elements | Sensitive data and critical code only appear within the (often tamperproof) hardware elements | Varies: encrypt if not hardware-confined | Hardware | (e.g., coprocessors) |
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