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Infrastructure-less security | Main operation | Main strength | Main weakness |
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CAM [102, 111] | Correspondence with the generated key pair at the initialization phase | Defence against falsification attack | The protocol cannot ensure MN node reliability |
caTBUA [112, 113] | Using context information to validate an appropriate CoA dynamically | It outperforms the existing BU authentication protocols | Requires more information to build the context |
IBS [88] | It includes two security primitives: encryption and signature | Ensures two-way origin authentication | Requires comparing levels of security |
UDHBU [114] | It utilizes the signalling on a low-layer level to exchange DH variables | It does not require having preestablished SAs between relevant MAGs | Vulnerable to DoS, MITM, and false BU attacks |
SDR [104] | Home registration and correspondent registration | Defence against rerun attack, false BU message, and MiTM attacks | The registration requires time |
PKBU [115] | Provide a cryptographic binding between the CN and MN | The address ownership is assured | It does not cover the CoA ownership |
OEAP [109] | Incorporating the OAE based on the random oracle model to provide both security and efficiency | Involves fewer security computations than the other BU schemes | Introduces high computational work |
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