A Systematic Approach to Formal Analysis of QUIC Handshake Protocol Using Symbolic Model Checking

Table 1

Protocol messages and their annotations.

Message	Annotation
CEPri	Client’s ephemeral Diffie–Hellman private value
LPri	Server’s long-term DH private value
SEPri	Server’s ephemeral Diffie–Hellman private value
LPub	Server’s long-term DH public value
g	Primitive root
CEPub	Client’s ephemeral Diffie–Hellman public value
SEPub	Server’s ephemeral Diffie–Hellman public value
InitKC	Initial key of client
InitKS	Initial key of server
FSKC	Forward-secure key of client
FSKS	Forward-secure key of server
pkS	Public signature key of the server
skS	Private signature key of the server
{} skS	{} is signed using the private signature key of the server
{} InitKC	{} is encrypted using the initial key of client
{} InitKS	{} is encrypted using the initial key of server
{} FSKS	{} is encrypted using the forward-secure key of server