Research Article
BusCount: A Provable Replay Protection Solution for Automotive CAN Networks
Table 1
Comparison of different authentication approaches for CAN-Bus (HW: Hardware, SW: Software, C : Counter, T : Timestamp, N : Nonce,
: not described)
| | HW change | SW change | Central component | Freshness technique | MAC | Encryption | Transfer techniques for MAC | Syncronisation of freshness value |
| AUTOSAR [2] | - | ✓ | - | C / T | ✓ | - | 28 bit data field | ✓ | CaCAN [24] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | C | ✓ | - | 8 bit data field | - | CANAuth [35] | ✓ | ✓ | - | C | ✓ | - | CAN+ | (✓) | Groll et al. [14] | - | ✓ | ✓ | C | ✓ | ✓ | | - | LeiA [31] | - | ✓ | - | C | ✓ | - | sep. message | ✓ | LibrA-CAN [16] | - | ✓ | ✓ | C | ✓ | - | CAN+ | - | Lin et al. [25] | - | ✓ | - | C | ✓ | - | | (✓) | Ueda et al. [34] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | C | ✓ | - | 8 bit data field | - | VeCure [37] | - | ✓ | - | C | ✓ | - | separate message | - | MaCAN [20] | - | ✓ | ✓ | T | ✓ | - | 32 bit data field | ✓ | VatiCAN [28] | - | ✓ | ✓ | C + N | ✓ | - | separate message | ✓ | vulCAN [7] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | C + N | ✓ | - | separate message | (✓) | Woo et al. [38] | - | (✓) | (✓) | key refresh | ✓ | ✓ | CAN-FD | - | LCAP [21] | - | ✓ | - | hash chain | - | ✓ | 16 bit extended ID | ✓ | TouCAN [3] | - | ✓ | - | - | ✓ | ✓ | 24 bit data field | - | Siddiqui et al. [33] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | - | ✓ | ✓ | data field | - | CAN-TORO [15] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Authenticated ID | - | - | - | (✓) |
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