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| Consensus | Main idea | Solution effect | Existing problems |
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| Casper | Allocates and controls the margin to drive verifier validation and consensus. In the event of an “invalid” action, the deposit is forfeited, and participation in the consensus is not possible | Solves the “nothing-at-stake” problem. Ensures that the benefits are maximised in the alliance composed of 100% consensus nodes to resist the attack of the majority alliance | |
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| CTFG | Allocates and controls the margin to drive verifier validation and consensus. If an “invalid” action occurs, the deposit is forfeited | Solves the “nothing-at-stake” problem and resists the attack of the majority alliance | |
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| CFFG | The probability of a node being selected is proportional to the weight of the deposit, and at least two-thirds of the validators’ legal votes are obtained in each round | Makes the nodes fully online, maintaining the security of the Ethereum network | Many nodes participate in betting on the verification of the initiative to reduce, preferring not to act |
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| 2-hop | PoS rights are introduced on the basis of PoW computing power so that blockchain security is built on the basis that honest nodes occupy the majority of joint resources | Solves 51% attacks and greatly improves the security of the blockchain | |
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| PoA | The principle of the longest main chain is used to suppress forks. Parts of the PoW tokens are distributed to active nodes in a lottery. The rights and interests of nodes are proportional to the probability of winning | Has security higher than that of PoW and PoS, which encourages miners to keep running online and is conducive to the healthy operation of the currency | The verification of nodes in the entire network has become complicated, and there is no specific profit distribution plan |
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| CoA | Within a certain period of time, a stakeholder is randomly selected to create a new block, similar to an online lottery | Overcomes the fork problem of PoS to a certain extent | There is no clear plan for the distribution of specific benefits |
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| PoB | By burning tokens to compete for the right to produce new blocks, PoB makes the probability of a node being selected proportional to the number of burned tokens | Reduces dependence on low bit rate external randomness | There is a waste of token resources; mining capacity is gradually controlled by those who have more resources and are willing to burn tokens |
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| PoSV | PoW is used to realise token distribution and uses PoSV to maintain long-term network security. The linear function of coin age and time is modified into an exponential decay function | Eliminates the phenomenon of currency hoarding by currency holders | |
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| PoWaS | The difficulty of hash calculation is reduced; the upper limits for coin age and effective holding time are set; and the package accounting rights are determined by the time spent looking for random numbers, coin age, and credit value | Increases the difficulty of double spending and forks and prevents replay attacks | The stability of block speed is not ideal, and the adjustment of credit value needs to be further studied |
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