An Enhanced RFID-Based Authentication Protocol using PUF for Vehicular Cloud Computing

Table 1

Summary of cryptographic techniques applied and limitations of previous existing user authentication mechanisms.

Scheme	Year	Cryptographic techniques	Advantages	Drawbacks/limitations
Jiang et al. [3]	2018	(i) Uses “one-way cryptographic hash function”	(i) Fits for vehicular cloud networking environment	(i) Fails to preserve “revocability”
				(ii) Prone to “replay attack”
Alamr et al. [5]	2018	(i) Based on “RFID”	(i) Applicable in IoT environment	(i) Does not support “revocability and password/biometric update”
		(ii) Applies “ECC cryptographic technique”		(ii) Vulnerable to “data integrity and key compromise”
		(iii) Uses “to support IoT”
Dinarvand and Barati [6]	2019	(i) Based on “RFID technology” uses “one-way cryptographic hash function”	(i) Does not fit for generic IoT networking environment	(i) Fails to preserve “impersonation and key compromise”
		(ii) Based on “ECC cryptographic technique”		(ii) No “formal security” analysis
Bagga et al. [1]	2018	(i) Based on “three factors (user mobile device, user password, and personal biometrics”	(i) Applicable in industrial IoT environment	(i) Does not support “revocability and password/biometric update”
		(ii) Applies “ECC cryptographic technique”		(ii) Vulnerable to “known session key attack”
		(iii) Uses “fuzzy extractor for biometric verification”
Kumar et al. [7]	2020	(i) Based on “three factors (smart card, user password, and biometrics)” uses “one-way cryptographic hash function”	(i) Fits for generic IoT networking environment	(i) Fails to preserve “revocability”
		(ii) Based on “fuzzy extractor for biometric verification”		(ii) No “formal security” analysis
Jiang et al. [4]	2018	(i) Based on “three factors (user mobile device, user password, and personal biometrics”	(i) Applicable in cloud environment	(i) Does not support “revocability and password/biometric update”
		(ii) Applies “ECC cryptographic technique”		(ii) Vulnerable to “known session key attack”
		(iii) Uses “fuzzy extractor for biometric verification”
Hosseinzadeh et al. [8]	2020	(i) Based on “RFID systems” uses “one-way cryptographic hash function”	(i) Fits for IoT networking environment	(i) Fails to preserve “revocability”
				(ii) No “session key agreement”
Zhu [9]	2020	(i) Based on “RFID systems and quadratic residue” uses “Gong-Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic”	(i) Fits for healthcare environment	(i) Fails to preserve “revocability”
		(ii) Confined to “healthcare system”		(ii) Desynchronization issues
Gabsi et al. [10]	2021	(i) Based on “RFID systems” uses “arithmetic calculation of ECC”	(i) Fits for communicating reader to reader environment	(i) Does not have to freedom to connect with the cloud server
		(ii) Based on “ECC cryptographic system”		(ii) Not suitable for cloud environment
Mishra et al. [11]	2018	(i) Based on “three factors (user mobile device, user password, and personal biometrics”	(i) Applicable in industrial IoT environment	(i) Does not support “revocability and password/biometric update”
		(ii) Applies “ECC cryptographic technique”		(ii) Vulnerable to “known session key attack”
		(iii) Uses “fuzzy extractor for biometric verification”
Safkhani et al. [2]	2021	(i) Based on “RFID and ECC cryptosystem” Uses “one-way cryptographic hash function”	(i) Fits for IoT networking environment	(i) Fails to establish “mutual authentication”
				(i) No proper “session key agreement”
				(ii) Could not resist “denial-of-service”